If, on the other hand, the premise is universal, then the conclusion is so as well, and it is then a conclusion that non-theists can accept with equanimity. I am not convinced that this criticism does justice to the text of the Meditations. On the evidence of the text, then, the idea of God is not quantificational: what Descartes has is an idea of a particular supremely perfect being.
From the idea of God, we can immediately see that the claim that God is omnipotent is true. But, thinks Descartes, we can see no less immediately that the claim that God exists is true: existence belongs to the true and immutable nature of God no less than does omnipotence. An encapsulation of this argument might run as follows: 1. The true and immutable nature of God includes supreme perfection.
Premise 2. Premise 3. From 1, 2. Therefore God is supremely perfect. From 3, disquotational property of truth 5. Supreme perfection includes existence, i. Premise 6. Therefore God exists. From 4, 5 4. But it is clear that 4. To this argument he gives the following formulation: 1. If a thing can be conceived not to exist, its essence or nature does not involve existence.
Existence belongs to the nature of substance 3. Therefore The infinite substance cannot be conceived not to exist. If an infinite substance exists, then God exists. What cannot be conceived not to exist, exists necessarily. Therefore God, the infinite substance, necessarily exists.
It is not the case that there is a thing such that: i it and only it is an infinite substance, and ii it can be conceived not to exist and: 3b. There is such a thing that i it and only it is an infinite substance, and ii it is not the case that it can be conceived not to exist.
But this by Prop. Therefore God necessarily exists. God are something than which nothing greater can be thought. I suspect that Anselm would have been happy with the answer that it is God that is in the mind of the Fool. At least one thing than which nothing greater can be thought exists in the mind. Premise, justified by preliminary argument. Whatever exists solely in the mind can be thought to exist in reality too.
It is greater to exist also in reality than it is to exist merely in the mind. Premise 4. Nothing can be thought that is thereby thought to be greater than something than which nothing greater can be thought. Premise 5. Hence At least one thing than which nothing greater can be thought exists both in the mind and in reality.
From 1, 2, 3, and 4. About this formulation of the argument, Sobel says that the fatal flaw occurs in the preliminary argument for the first premise. But he can wonder whether he has in mind a thing described by them, for he can understand that he does have a thing in mind, given how these words describe things, if and only if such things exist in reality.
In particular, if there are many different readings of the text that yield arguments that go wrong in very different ways, then there are surely grounds for saying that it is actually the perfect island objection that is deepest and most important. Sobel is perhaps right that critics cannot be content with putting ontological arguments in bad company. But putting ontological arguments in bad company might nonetheless be a significant philosophical achievement.
In his discussion of modern modal ontological arguments, Sobel discusses the following argument due, essentially, to Hartshorne : 1. It is possible that there exists a perfect being. It is necessarily the case that, for all x, it is necessarily the case that, if x is perfect, then it is necessarily the case that x exists and is perfect. Therefore There exists a perfect being. From 1, 2 and many variants thereof. About all of these arguments, he observes that the crucial difficulty lies in the first premise: because conceivability does not entail possibility, there is no non-question-begging justification that can be offered for this premise.
It is not, to cut to the main thing, a possible property of a being whom one could without absurdity worship. I am sceptical of the idea that a necessarily existent being could be worthy of worship; but that is because I am sceptical of that idea that there could be any proper object of worship.
At the very least, this matter deserves further serious investigation. A unique perfect being would be deontically perfect. Hence It ought to be the case that there is a unique perfect being. Hence It is possible that there is a unique perfect being. Hence It is the case that there is a unique perfect being. In Oppy I claimed that this formulation is not marred by an equivocation in its use of indefinite descriptions.
Sobel disagrees. See n Now, I agree that the formulation of 1. My intention was something like this: 1. An interesting feature of the argument, … Expand. View 1 excerpt, cites background. The Logical Problem of Evil. In this paper I offer a logical argument from evil against the existence of the God of standard philosophical theism, that is, a God who is conceived as a perfect being. I then support a … Expand. Hegel Bulletin. On this reading, the main purpose of the chapter is a critical engagement with … Expand.
Philosophy, Computer Science. God is traditionally understood to be a perfect being who is the creator and sustainer of all that is. God's creative and sustaining activity is often thought to involve choosing a possible world for … Expand. View 3 excerpts, cites background. It is a curiosity of the history of ideas that the argument from miracles is today better known as the object of a famous attack than as a piece of reasoning in its own right.
It was not always so. Highly Influenced. Historically, the philosophical literature on the ontological argument has primarily been concerned with the assessment of the argument in terms of its validity or lack thereof. Jordan Howard Sobel — — Ars Disputandi thwism. Thanks for telling us about tyeism problem. Jason Gordon marked it as to-read May 05, Again, the great technicalities involved in the issue are brought out and expertly dealt with. Lists with Sobep Book. The Logic of Miracles — Part 3: It does not seem to me that such an action is performed frequently or that it is performed by psychologically normal people.
Sobel is the author of more than 75 refereed publications in philosophy, as well as four books. The book is long, abstruse, technical making ample use of symbolic logic and Bayesian notationand written in a rather difficult style. The last chapter examines Pascalian arguments for and against belief in God. I taught philosophy to thousands of students, and not a single one of them ever put any stock in it.
Before you dismiss, please consider making a donation. Inthe University of Uppsala bestowed an honorary doctorate on Sobel. Sign in to use this feature.
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